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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the microeconomic effects of one major feature of the 
German Hartz reforms (2003-2005), namely the reduction in compensation duration for older 
unemployed above 45 years of age. We look at two potential effects of this measure: on job 
take-up rates, but also on post-unemployment outcomes, through various indicators of 
matching quality (job stability, skill adequacy) and job quality (type of job contract). Applying 
difference-in-differences estimators, we show that the effects of this specific feature were 
rather scant. Regarding unemployment duration, only unemployed within a specific age group 
(55 to 59 years old) were affected by the reform. Evidence suggests that this is because they 
previously used unemployment schemes as a bridge to early retirement. In addition, there is 
some evidence of detrimental effects on job or matching quality. 
Keywords: unemployment benefits, unemployment duration, job matching, job quality, early 
retirement, difference-in-differences 
JEL codes: C41, J64, J26 
 
L’impact des réformes Hartz sur la durée de chômage et la qualité de l’emploi repris 
Une approche en différence-de-différences 
Résumé: Dans cet article, nous analysons les effets microéconomiques de l’une des mesures 
phares des réformes allemandes Hartz (2003-2005), à savoir la réduction de la durée 
d’indemnisation pour les chômeurs de plus de 45 ans. Nous étudions deux effets potentiels de 
cette mesure: sur le taux de reprise d’emploi, mais aussi sur le type d’emploi repris à travers 
un ensemble d’indicateurs de qualité de l’appariement (stabilité de l’emploi, adéquation des 
compétences) et de l’emploi (type de contrats). A partir d’une estimation en différence-de-
différences, nous montrons que les effets de cette mesure ont été relativement limités. En ce 
qui concerne le taux de reprise d’emploi, seuls les chômeurs d’un certain groupe d’âge (de 55 
à 59 ans) ont été significativement affectés par la réforme. Des éléments indiquent que cet 
effet est lié à l’utilisation antérieure par ce groupe de chômeurs de la filière d’indemnisation 
chômage comme d’une passerelle vers la retraite anticipée. En complément, nous mettons en 
évidence certains effets pervers de la réforme sur la qualité de l’emploi et de l’appariement. 
Mots-clés: assurance chômage, durée de chômage, appariement sur le marché du travail, 
qualité de l’emploi, dispositifs de pré-retraite, différence-de-différences 
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1. Introduction 
Against the backdrop of the current Great Recession, Germany is commonly depicted in 
public debates as an economic ‘success story’ and a potential model for other European 
countries. Moreover, its current good labour market performances are often ascribed to the set 
of measures implemented by the Social Democratic-Green coalition from 2003 to 2005, 
usually referred to as the Hartz reforms (CAE, 2012, p. 5; OECD, 2012, pp. 10-11). These 
structural reforms have profoundly transformed the German unemployment insurance system 
and its administration, while they also brought minor changes to the employment protection 
legislation: they notably led to substantial cuts in unemployment benefits and increased 
pressures on unemployed. 
The conventional view in economics posits that such measures should indeed decrease 
unemployment, by lowering the reservation wage of workers and by increasing the incentives 
for the unemployed to take up jobs. In this framework, generous benefits reduce work 
incentives because they alter the labour/leisure trade-off of unemployed. Moreover, they 
might lead unemployed to delay re-entry into the labour market as they wait for better job 
offers, as predicted by standard matching theories (Mortensen, 1987; Pissarides, 2000). Cuts 
in benefits generosity should therefore decrease the duration of unemployment spells, but at 
the same time they might have detrimental effects on post-unemployment outcomes. As they 
would force unemployed to take up jobs where their skills are not optimally exploited, 
workers productivity might suffer and subsequent employment might be less stable. This 
mechanism might be especially relevant in the German context, where workers skills have the 
property of being very specific (Hall and Soskice, 2001): consequently, the amount and 
availability of jobs that would match their skills appears to be limited (Iversen and Soskice, 
2001). Eventually, cuts in benefits might also negatively affect the well-being of workers, by 
forcing them into jobs of lower quality. 
This paper focuses on one of the major feature of the Hartz reforms, namely the strong cuts in 
unemployment compensation duration for unemployed above 45 years of age. We take 
advantage of the particular design of this measure to evaluate its causal effect on job take-up 
rates and post-unemployment outcomes through a difference-in-differences estimation, using 
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Results of duration models first show that this 
measure only had a limited impact on job take-up rates by the unemployed, and that this effect 
was concentrated on a specific age group (55 to 59 years old) who previously used 
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unemployment compensation as a bridge to early retirement. Additional evidence is exhibited 
in support of this claim. 
Furthermore, we analyse the potential impact of this reform on the quality of post-
unemployment outcomes, taking into account various measures of matching quality (job 
stability, skills adequacy) and job quality (type of contract). We also find re-employment 
duration to have significantly increased for the 55-59 age group specifically. While this comes 
in contradiction with job matching theories, it corroborates our point that contemporaneous 
changes in early retirement provisions caused workers to delay labour market exit. 
Eventually, some detrimental effects of the reform on post-unemployment outcomes are 
found: skills inadequacy has increased for the oldest unemployed (60-64 years old) while 
unemployed aged 50 to 54 experienced slightly more exits toward part-time employment. 
This paper is organised as follows. The following section presents major features of the Hartz 
reforms. Section 3 reviews the main results of the literature that focuses on the 
microeconomic effects of benefits generosity on the job take-up rates by the unemployed. 
Section 4 details the features of the measure that reduced compensation duration and presents 
our estimation strategy. Main results of this analysis are presented in Section 5. The final 
section concludes. 
2. The Hartz reforms 
The Hartz reforms consisted of four packages of measures (Table 1). They entailed substantial 
changes in various areas of the unemployment policy, such as the creation of single gateways 
for the benefit and employment administrations, the development of new training programmes 
or the introduction of government-sponsored jobs (the infamous Ein-Euro-Jobs). In this 
paper, we focus in particular on the potential effects of the Hartz IV package, implemented in 
January 2005, as it involved a drastic decrease of the unemployment insurance generosity. 
Prior to the reform, the German unemployment insurance system was organised around three 
schemes; unemployed who were eligible based on their  past contributions were entitled to 
earnings-related benefits from the unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld I); once their 
rights were exhausted, they could still enjoy earnings-related benefits from the unemployment 
assistance (at a lower replacement rate though), virtually for an unlimited period of time 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe); only unemployed without entitlements to UI benefits had to rely on flat-
rate means-tested social assistance (Sozialhilfe). With the Hartz IV reform, unemployment 
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assistance was merged with social assistance into a new flat-rate means-tested benefit 
(Arbeitslosengeld II), which implied significant benefit cuts for about two thirds of the 
unemployed that formerly depended on these two schemes (Goebel and Richter, 2012). The 
new scheme was particularly unfavourable to former recipients of the unemployment 
assistance, who represented about one half of all unemployed with compensation in 2003 
(Chagny, 2005, p.14). The benefits of the new scheme were no longer earnings-related. 
Moreover, criteria of job suitability were strengthened as references to conventional wages or 
geographical distance were removed. Those who formerly depended on the social assistance 
generally experienced monetary gains from the reform, but these gains were very marginal in 
most cases. Furthermore, these recipients also lost from the reform on other fronts. For 
example, many of these welfare recipients were not exempted from job search anymore and at 
the same time sanctions in case of job refusals were strengthened. 
Finally, introduction of new rules for unemployment insurance compensation also implied 
less generosity. The necessary contributions for unemployment insurance were now 
calculated on the 2 years preceding dismissal (3 years before), strengthening the eligibility 
requirements. The maximum compensation duration for unemployed above 45 years of age 
 
 
Table 1: Synthetic presentation of Hartz reforms 
Law Main features Time of 
implementation 
Hartz I 
(23/12/2002) 
 
Reform of public employment service 
Creation of PSA (Personal-Service-Agentur), private 
employment placement agencies in charge of placing 
unemployed people into temporary agency jobs 
Temporary agency work 
Restrictions in the use of temporary agency work are 
cancelled (no duration limit (maximum of 2 years before)) 
Reform of unemployment benefits system 
Time duration before the first appointment at the 
employment agency is shortened. Criteria of acceptation of 
a job are strengthened for unemployed with no family; the 
burden of proof is reversed. 
Reform of public employment service 
Training vouchers are introduced: creation of a new tool 
for the unemployed. 
01/01/2003 
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Hartz II 
(23/12/2002) 
 
Reform of subsidized jobs: mini and midi jobs 
The aim is to remove poverty traps and to develop low-
paid jobs. 
Reform of subsidized jobs: Ich AG 
Supporting schemes for one-man enterprises - targeted at 
people who receive unemployment benefits (either from 
insurance or assistance schemes) or who are in subsidized 
jobs (ABM and SAM) 
Reform of public employment service 
Job Centers are created. Regional employment agencies 
become “one-stop” centers.  
 
01/04/2003 
Hartz III 
(23/12/2003) 
 
Reform of public employment service 
New monitoring tools are created at the federal level; local 
agencies are given more autonomy. Control and 
supervision of the unemployed increase. 
Reform of unemployment benefits system 
The period of reference used to calculate unemployment 
benefits is reduced to two years. 
Reform of subsidized jobs 
ABM and SAM schemes are merged. The maximum 
duration for subsidized jobs is reduced. 
 
 
01/01/2004 
Laws on 
labour 
market 
reforms 
(24/12/2003) 
 
Dismissal rules : more flexibility 
The minimum number of employees required for the 
application of unfair dismissal procedures increases from 5 
to 10 employees. 
Change in rules governing dismissal of workers in case of 
dismissal for economic reasons 
Reform of unemployment benefits system 
The maximum duration of unemployment benefits is 
reduced from 32 to 18 months 
 
01/01/2004 
01/02/2006 
Hartz IV 
(24/12/2003) 
 
Reform of unemployment benefits system 
Social assistance and unemployment assistance are merged 
into a single scheme. 
For people who are able to work, social assistance benefits 
and unemployment assistance benefits are transformed into 
a means-tested minimum income scheme that requires 
active job search. 
 
 
Source: Chagny (2005, Table 3 p.8) 
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was reduced to 18 months, compared to 36 months previously.3 For unemployed without 
familial ties, reference to geographical distance was also removed from the criteria of job 
suitability after four months of unemployment and the burden of proof that a job was not-
suitable was now on the unemployed. To sum up, opt-out options for workers were severely 
reduced as a result of the reform. This should increase employment according to conventional 
views in economics. 
3. Benefits generosity, unemployment duration and job 
matching quality: empirical evidence in the literature 
There is a large empirical literature dealing with the microeconomic effects of unemployment 
benefits generosity. Traditionally, these evaluations focus on the quantitative effects of a 
variation in the generosity of benefits on the time spent in unemployment. Their basic 
assumption is that unemployment insurance creates disincentives for job seekers to look 
actively for a job, leading to longer unemployment spells. Most of them use policy shifts or 
discontinuities as natural experiments to isolate the causal impact of variation in potential 
benefit duration or benefit level. They usually find robust evidence in line with theoretical 
predictions about the detrimental effects of generous benefits. 
In a seminal paper, Katz and Meyer (1990) use the differences in potential benefits duration 
across U.S. states and find significant and substantive disincentives effects. The size of these 
effects was discussed by follow-up studies. Card and Levine (2000) notably raise the question 
of policy endogeneity bias, which relates to the fact that benefits are often targeted at 
individuals who have especially bad employment prospects. Exploiting an exogenous 
variation in benefit duration in New Jersey, they still find unemployment insurance to 
significantly enhance the length of the unemployment spell. But the size of this effect is more 
modest once policy endogeneity is accounted for.4 
Some studies have specifically dealt with the impact of unemployment insurance in Germany. 
Hunt (1995) analyses the impact of the extension of potential benefits duration to unemployed 
                                                 
3These two latter features were enacted contemporaneously to the Hartz reforms, but were implemented in 
February 2006. 
4
 In an analysis of the 1989 unemployment insurance reform in Austria, a country which shares more similarities 
with Germany than the U.S., the results of Lalive et al. (2006, p. 1029) also suggest that the magnitude of these 
effects, while significant, is not very large. They notably find that an additional week of benefit duration leads to 
a 0.05 weeks increase in unemployment duration, while an increase by one percentage point of the replacement 
rate leads to a 0.15 weeks increase in unemployment duration. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.20
7 
 
older than 42 years of age in the 1980s. Her empirical strategy is very similar to the one used 
in this section, as it is also based on difference-in-differences estimators applied to the SOEP 
dataset. She notably finds that longer benefits entitlement had a significant negative impact on 
job take-up rates by unemployed. In a more recent evaluation of this reform, Fitzenberger and 
Wilke (2010) provide results in contradiction with Hunt (1995). Using an administrative 
dataset, they do not find any impact of the extended benefit entitlement on unemployment 
spells that end with a new job. Besides, they show that this extension was in fact used by 
firms and older workers as part of early retirement schemes, which is in line with the results 
presented in this paper. 
Beside disincentive effects, theoretical contributions have also emphasized the importance of 
unemployment benefits to enhance the efficiency of the job matching process. In this 
framework, more generous benefits give workers the opportunity to wait for jobs that fit their 
skills better (Jovanovic, 1979; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999).5 Accordingly, this should be 
reflected in post-unemployment outcomes. More generous benefits should improve job 
matching quality, thus enhancing productivity (wages) and job stability. The empirical results 
about such effects are mixed. Addison and Blackburn (2000) find weak effects of generous 
benefits on re-employment wages in a U.S. dataset, while Card et al. (2007) find no effects on 
re-employment wages or subsequent job stability in an Austrian dataset. Using a panel from 
eight European countries, Tatsiramos (2009) finds a positive effect of generous benefits on 
job stability. For Germany, Caliendo et al. (2009) use the discontinuity in unemployment 
benefits around age 45 (prior to the Hartz IV reform, see Table 2) to identify post-
unemployment outcomes. They find a positive effect of longer compensation duration on both 
re-employment wages and job stability. On the contrary, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) find 
that the 1980s reforms improved neither re-employment wages nor job stability. 
4. Empirical strategy 
In this paper, we investigate more thoroughly the microeconomic effects of one major feature 
of the Hartz IV package, namely the reduction in compensation duration for older 
unemployed. We look at two potential effects of this measure: on job take-up rates, but also 
on post-unemployment outcomes, through various indicators of matching quality (job 
                                                 
5
 See also Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). In this paper, the authors provide a theoretical framework where benefit 
generosity raise the incentives for the unemployed to wait for jobs with high wages, which in turn increases the 
incentives for firms to propose such high-wage jobs. 
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stability, skill adequacy) and job quality (type of job contract). Applying difference-in-
differences estimators, we show that the effects of this specific feature were rather scant. 
Regarding unemployment duration, only unemployed within a specific age group were 
affected by the reform. Evidence suggests that this is because they previously used 
unemployment schemes as a bridge to early retirement. In addition, there is no convincing 
evidence of detrimental effects on job or matching quality. 
4.1. Institutional background 
Table 2 depicts the drop in the potential compensation duration induced by the Hartz IV 
package. This feature was actually implemented in February 2006, and was targeted at 
unemployed aged 45 or older, who previously enjoyed longer compensation duration. Its 
impact on benefits generosity was quite dramatic, as maximal benefits duration was more than 
halved for some age groups (52-54), with duration reductions ranging from 6 to 14 months. 
Potential benefit duration was eventually re-extended by 3 to 6 months for some age groups 
by the Grand Coalition in January 2008, but still remained significantly below its original 
level, with duration reductions (compared to 2005 levels) ranging from 6 to 14 months.  
Table 2: Summary of institutional changes in the potential compensation duration 
Age group 
  Maximal duration of benefits in months 
  
From January 1, 1997 
 to January 31, 2006 
From February 1, 2006 
 to December 31, 2007 
Since January 1, 2008 
Under 45  12 12 12 
45-46  18 12 12 
47-49 
 
22 12 12 
50-51  22 12 15 
52-54  26 12 15 
55-56  26 18 18 
57-57  32 18 18 
58 or older   32 18 24 
 
As already mentioned, many older unemployed were actually using the rather long 
compensation duration implemented in the 1980s as a bridge to early retirement. This strategy 
was particularly beneficial for firms, as they could more easily negotiate dismissals for older 
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and less productive workers. Besides, numerous regulations facilitated such early retirement 
schemes (Müller et al., 2007). In particular, persons who had already experienced one year of 
unemployment had the opportunity of entering early retirement without pension reductions at 
age 60, despite the legal retirement age of 65 in Germany. Moreover, unemployed aged 58 or 
older were exempt from active job search requirements, while nevertheless receiving 
unemployment benefits. Hence, workers with maximum entitlements could build a bridge to 
early retirement from the age of 57 years and 5 months, exhausting their 32 months of 
benefits. They could actually retire on benefits at an even earlier age, as they could still enjoy 
earnings-related benefits from the unemployment assistance scheme after insurance benefits 
exhaustion prior to 2005 (at a lower replacement rate though). 
These regulations were strengthened, which made early retirement strategy less attractive for 
workers. First, between 1997 and 2004 pensions were progressively reduced for individuals 
who retired before the legal age of 65. Eventually, individuals faced a 3.6 percentage points 
discount on their pensions for each year that separated them from the legal age of 65 years. 
For instance, persons who entered unemployment at the age of 57 years and 5 months could 
still enjoy early retirement at age 60 after benefits exhaustion, but with a pension reduction of 
18 percent. Despite this lower generosity, Dlugosz et al. (2009) suggest that early retirement 
schemes were still commonly used by older workers until the 2006 unemployment benefits 
reform (see Figure 1 p. 10). More recently, the minimum age for early retirement was 
progressively raised over a transition period (2006–2012) from 60 to 63 years. Combined with 
the reform of unemployment benefit duration and the end of earning-related unemployment 
assistance, this change has significantly lowered the incentives for older workers to enter 
early retirement. Indeed, it is now possible to use unemployment benefits as a bridge to 
retirement only from the age of 61 years onwards, while still facing a pension discount of 7.2 
percent. 
4.2. Sample and main covariates 
This paper assesses the effect of the cuts in benefits duration on the length of the 
unemployment spell and on post-unemployment outcomes. Our sample consists of 7846 
unemployment spells from the SOEP dataset from 1997 to 2009 where we observe the entry 
into unemployment (i.e. not left-censored).6 In this longitudinal panel, respondents answer 
                                                 
6
 See Table A1 in appendix for descriptive statistics. 
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questions about various socio-economic characteristics relating to the interview year and also 
fill in a calendar about their labour force status in each month of the previous year.7 
Individuals checking the box "registered as unemployed" (that is, at the employment office) 
are considered unemployed. We first focus on the job take-ups by these unemployed without 
distinguishing between type of exits to employment, full-time job, part-time job or mini-job. 
Besides, exits to inactivity and retirement are treated as competing risks. Unemployment 
spells which end this way are accordingly coded as right-censored.8 Similarly, unemployed 
reaching the legal retirement age of 65 years during their spell are right-censored, while 
unemployed age 65 or older are dropped. 
In a second step, we investigate potential effects of the reform on three different post-
unemployment outcomes. We first investigate the reform impact on job stability, measured by 
the time spent in the first job after the end of the spell. It is a classical measure of job 
matching quality, as a quick separation possibly indicates that the workers’ skills were ill-
adapted to his new job. The SOEP yearly interviews also allow us to dispose of a rich variety 
of information about the type of job that is found. One interesting variable is the one about 
skill adequacy, where respondents assess whether they are actually working in the occupation 
they were trained for. This variable is thus particularly relevant to measure job matching 
quality. The last post-unemployment outcome we investigate is the type of contract (full-time 
job, part-time job or mini-job). The idea here is to see whether cuts in duration had the effect 
of fostering atypical employment. 
4.3. Estimation strategy 
Our estimation strategy relies on a difference-in-differences estimation. This is made possible 
by the change in the legislation that only affected unemployed aged 45 or older. Difference-
in-differences estimation is indeed well-suited to identify the causal impact of policy shifts 
where only a part of the population is affected by the law change. Basically, unemployed are 
divided into treatment and control groups using a dummy. The treated are the part of the 
population to whom the benefit duration cut applied, while the control group remained 
                                                 
7
 The design of the SOEP dataset makes it difficult to compare wages before and after the unemployment spell, 
although this is often used as a measure of job matching quality in the literature. Indeed, information on wages is 
contained within the yearly interviews only. We would lose a too large number of observations in the process of 
recovering this information from the yearly interviews - especially for long-term unemployed not interviewed 
before entering unemployment. 
8
 Exits to inactivity and retirement amount to less than one third of total exits (see Table 3). Besides, we do not 
observe any exits for about 15% of all spells, because of individuals’ drop-out of the survey. 
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unaffected. We then compare outcomes for the treatment and control groups before and after 
the reform implementation. If the treated experienced a larger variation in one of these 
outcomes as compared to the control group, the difference is ascribed to the reform effect. 
Hence, the identifying assumption behind difference-in-differences estimation is that trends in 
employment outcomes would have been the same for the treated and the control group in the 
absence of a change in the law. In particular, it implies that macroeconomic effects or other 
changes in the legislation had a similar impact on both groups as the reform was 
implemented.9 In order to make this ‘common trends’ assumption more reasonable, we 
restrict our control group to individuals aged 35 to 44. Indeed, there are concerns that younger 
unemployed could still be marginally attached to the education system, Germans entering the 
labour market at a relatively high age. 
In our empirical analysis, we first consider the impact of the reform on the job take-up rate by 
unemployed. In its most parsimonious form, our estimation strategy relies on the following 
unemployment-to-employment hazard rate (at a given time  of the spell):  ሺ ሻ      ሺ ሻ                                                     
where   is a vector of covariates and   ሺ ሻ the baseline hazard. Formally, the policy effect is 
given by the interaction term     between a time dummy (     ) taking the value one for 
spells commencing once the policy change was implemented (after February 2006) and a 
treatment group dummy (       ).10 Covariates include basic demographic variables (age, 
sex, marital status, nationality and a dummy for East Germans). They also include categories 
for the highest obtained degree, the number of spells already experienced by the individual 
and year dummies to control for economic fluctuations.11 
                                                 
9
 Important changes in unemployment compensation that concerned both the treatment and the control group 
include the merging of unemployment and social assistance and the reduction in the period used for entitlements 
calculation mentioned earlier. We want to emphasise here that our estimation strategy only allows us to assess 
the microeconomic impact of the cuts in duration, and not the impact of these two other features of the Hartz 
reforms. 
10
 More precisely, the time dummy Hartz takes the value one for unemployment spells beginning in February 
2006 or later, because it is the date of entry into unemployment which determines benefit entitlements. 
Individuals who entered unemployment prior to that date were still subject to the old regulation, even when their 
spell continued after February 2006. 
11
 Recall that the Hartz time dummy refers to the calendar time of entering unemployment whereas the year 
dummies refer to the time of leaving unemployment. Thus identification of both year dummies and the Hartz 
time dummy is ensured as individuals entering unemployment at different points in time and are subject to the 
same macroeconomic shocks affecting recruitment out of unemployment. Nevertheless, we re-estimate the main 
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To assess the precise effects of the cuts in compensation duration, one would ideally want to 
build distinct treatment group dummies as older age groups were differently affected by the 
reform. Also, one would want to use distinct treatment period dummies to take into account 
the fact that the 2008 reform softened the initial cuts induced by Hartz IV for some age 
groups. This would require estimation of 10 distinct interaction terms (Table 2). This is not 
the strategy that we follow here because we want to keep a reasonable sample size in each 
treatment group.12 Still, we want to account for the fact that the effects of the cuts might differ 
across age groups, in particular because of early retirement strategies. We thus split the 
treated unemployed into four age groups of five years each. We end up with the following 
equation to estimate:  ሺ ሻ    ሺ ሻ                                                                                                                                   
We present our estimation using two specifications, taking into account in different ways the 
interrelated issues of duration dependency and unobserved heterogeneity. We first present a 
Partial Likelihood method allowing for flexible duration dependency and then a parametric 
strategy with flexible specification for unobserved heterogeneity. The issues are related 
because if unobserved factors cause early exit (there are many frail individuals), the hazard 
rate will decrease rapidly over time as the frail individuals are removed from the sample. 
We first estimate this equation using a Cox duration model. Such a model presents the 
advantage of being non-parametric with respect to the influence of spell duration, i.e. the 
model makes no assumption about the functional form of the baseline hazard, as long as it 
satisfies the proportional hazards assumption (i.e. the baseline hazard is multiplicatively 
separable).  
We now focus on a strategy modelling flexibly the frailty distribution. An alternative to the 
Cox Partial Likelihood model thus specifies a flexible distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity. We use the Gamma distribution, since Abbring and Van Den Berg (2007) show 
                                                                                                                                                        
equations from Tables 4 and 5 without year dummies as a robustness check. Our conclusions remain valid (see 
table A2 in appendix). 
12
 Moreover, the age variable we derive from the SOEP is not very accurate because it is based on the birth year 
only, whereas benefits entitlements are defined by actual age at entry into unemployment. It thus makes little 
sense to build narrow age groups with this variable. Note that this also leads us to exclude individuals celebrating 
their 45th birthday in a given year, as we cannot know for sure if they are treated (aged 45) or not (aged 44). 
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that under certain conditions, all forms of unobserved heterogeneity converge to a Gamma 
distribution in the survivor population, providing a justification for this functional form. In a 
second step we thus estimate our model using an exponential model allowing for gamma-
distributed unobserved heterogeneity (frailty).  
Finally, we use the same difference-in-differences identifying strategy for post-unemployment 
outcomes as for the hazard rate of finding a job out of unemployment. The model 
specifications are different though. For re-employment duration (job stability) we use a simple 
OLS regression. For skill adequacy and type of job contract we use multinomial logit 
regressions, as they allow for more than one possible outcome. 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Kaplan-Meier survival curves are displayed in Figure 1. They depict the probability of not 
having found a job after a given duration of unemployment. Five different figures are 
displayed: one for each age group (according to the intervals defined previously) and one for 
these age groups taken together (aged 45-64). In each of these figures we also report the 
survival curves for the control group (aged 35-44), so that we can get a first idea of the 
potential reform impact.  In the spirit of difference-in-differences, the reform impact is 
assessed by considering the difference in survival across the treatment and control groups 
against the backdrop of the reform. For instance, a sharper increase in the slope of the curves 
of the treated as compared to the control group would indicate faster exit from unemployment. 
First, one can see from these figures that the survival curves of the control group are always 
below those of the treated. Older unemployed typically face more difficulties to find a new 
job, a feature we control for in subsequent regressions. Moreover, we observe that 
unemployment duration generally decreased after the reform implementation, as depicted by 
the increase in the slope or the convexity of the curves. This is true for all groups including 
the control group. The ‘common trends’ assumption implies that without the reform, survival 
curves of the treated age groups would have experienced an equivalent evolution as those of 
the control group. However, we observe a sharper increase in the slope (or convexity) for the 
treated age groups, which suggests a negative impact of the reform on unemployment 
duration. This is especially obvious for the 45-49 and 55-59 age groups. To some extent this 
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could also be true for the 60-64 age group, but the figure lacks precision because data is 
scarcer for this group. 
 
Figure 1: Probability of remaining unemployed by length of unemployment spell 
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Source: SOEP, author’s calculations. Analysis time is months. 
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For the older age groups (aged 55-59 or 60-64), we suspect that the reform, combined with 
contemporaneous changes in early retirement provisions, made early retirement strategies less 
attractive. This point has also been made by Dlugosz et al. (2009). They show that the rate of 
separation of older workers significantly dropped after the 2006 reform. This suggests that 
firms and workers became less inclined to negotiate early dismissal. These findings are 
consistent with the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 3, which depicts the type of exits 
out of unemployment for different age groups, before and after the reform. We first observe 
that a significant share of the unemployed aged 55 or older were actually using 
unemployment benefits as a bridge to retirement before the reform. Furthermore, exits to 
retirement generally decreased after the reform: their share in total exits was more than 
halved. This decrease was particularly dramatic for unemployed aged 55-59 and 60-64, with 
respectively a drop of more than 30 and 20 percentage points in the share of total exits. 
This should strongly impact the average unemployment duration of these groups, but in a 
different way to the one predicted by job search theories. In job search models, cuts in 
benefits incite the unemployed to increase their job search efforts and/or to accept job offers 
earlier in their spell. The mechanism we observe here is different. Unemployed following an 
early retirement strategy were likely to fully exhaust their entitlement rights before entering 
retirement, in order to avoid future pension discounts. This enhanced average unemployment 
duration. As early retirement became less attractive with the reform implementation, the 
composition of the unemployed population changed: fewer workers entered unemployment to 
benefit from early retirement schemes. In turn, the share of unemployed actively looking for a 
job mechanically increased, and so did the unemployment-to-employment hazard rate. So the 
reform effect in this case is not to accelerate job take-up, but to prevent those who are likely 
to remain unemployed until benefits exhaustion from entering into unemployment. 
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Table 3: Type of exits out of unemployment (number and percent of observations) 
Before February 2006 
Age Full-time job Part-time job Mini-job Retirement Inactivity Total 
35-44 1661 406 80 45 520 2712 
 
61.2% 15.0% 3.0% 1.7% 19.2% 100.0% 
45-49 609 139 43 58 217 1066 
 
57.1% 13.0% 4.0% 5.4% 20.4% 100.0% 
50-54 463 97 26 128 143 857 
 
54.0% 11.3% 3.0% 14.9% 16.7% 100.0% 
55-59 216 69 24 600 87 996 
 
21.7% 6.9% 2.4% 60.2% 8.7% 100.0% 
60-64 18 6 6 116 10 156 
 
11.5% 3.8% 3.8% 74.4% 6.4% 100.0% 
Total 2967 717 179 947 977 5787 
  51.3% 12.4% 3.1% 16.4% 16.9% 100.0% 
From February 2006 
Age Full-time job Part-time job Mini-job Retirement Inactivity Total 
35-44 297 59 30 2 56 444 
 
66.9% 13.3% 6.8% 0.5% 12.6% 100.0% 
45-49 130 30 14 4 19 197 
 
66.0% 15.2% 7.1% 2.0% 9.6% 100.0% 
50-54 97 28 13 9 24 171 
 
56.7% 16.4% 7.6% 5.3% 14.0% 100.0% 
55-59 49 16 10 33 12 120 
 
40.8% 13.3% 8.3% 27.5% 10.0% 100.0% 
60-64 16 2 5 29 2 54 
 
29.6% 3.7% 9.3% 53.7% 3.7% 100.0% 
Total 589 135 72 77 113 986 
  59.7% 13.7% 7.3% 7.8% 11.5% 100.0% 
Source: SOEP, author’s calculations 
 
5.2. Reform impact on job take-ups 
Table 4 presents the results from estimation of the Cox Partial Likelihood model, where we 
assess the reform impact on job take-ups. Covariates which are typically associated with poor 
labour market outcomes have the expected signs on their coefficients and are statistically 
significant: being East German, non-German citizen, female, married, of old age, married and 
female, having no degree. On the contrary, individuals with good qualifications (in higher 
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education in particular) tend to exit faster from unemployment. This is also true for the 
unemployed who have already experienced spells of unemployment before. This can possibly 
be ascribed to the fact that they work in high turnover occupations, where both dismissal and 
hiring are frequent. 
Looking at the coefficients of the non-interacted age group dummies, we see that the 
unemployment-to-employment hazard rate is significantly lower for older age groups prior to 
the reform, even after age is controlled for. The coefficients are especially large for the 55-59 
and the 60-64 age groups. This is compatible with our assumption that many unemployed in 
these groups tended to exhaust their entitlement rights before retiring. As was already 
observable from the Kaplan-Meier survival curves, we see that the hazard rate generally 
increased after the implementation of the reform, as evidenced by the positive and significant 
coefficient for our treatment period dummy (Hartz). However, it cannot be ascribed to an 
effect of cuts in compensation duration as this coefficient also applies to the control group.13 
The reform impact is given by the interactions of the age group and reform dummies. The 
results here are broadly consistent with the descriptive statistics. All estimated coefficients are 
positive, which could suggest a positive effect of the cuts on unemployment duration. 
However, the interaction terms are only statistically significant for the 55-59 age group, at the 
5% threshold. The coefficient for the 60-64 age group is actually positive but not significant, 
probably because the sample size is relatively small for this group. This is in line with our 
argument that the reform mainly had the impact of deterring early retirement schemes. On the 
contrary, we argue that the reform did not have the kind of effect predicted by job search 
theories, or at least that these effects were not sizeable. Indeed, we do not observe a 
significant increase in the hazard rate of age groups where early retirement strategies were 
less prevalent, although they were affected by equivalent cuts in the duration of benefits (see 
Table 2). Finally, Table 4 provides estimation results for men and women separately. The 
coefficients for the interaction terms indicate that the reform impact on the 55-59 age group is 
actually driven by male unemployed. This could be explained by the fact that employers used 
early retirement as a tool to dismiss workers with long work history within the same firm, in 
order to avoid too high severance payments. As men typically have more stable careers, this 
population was more severely affected by the reform.  
                                                 
13While this indicates that unemployment duration was generally lower from 2006 onwards, it is out of or scope 
to ascertain whether this is an effect of the other features of the Hartz reforms mentioned earlier, or whether it is 
linked to more favourable labour market conditions. 
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Table 4: Unemployment-to-employment hazard rate analysis (Cox model) 
  All Men Women 
East German -0.060+ 0.031 -0.193*** 
 
[0.032] [0.042] [0.050] 
Non-German citizen -0.429*** -0.381*** -0.488*** 
 
[0.057] [0.069] [0.100] 
Age -0.019** -0.031*** -0.006 
 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.009] 
Married 0.396*** 0.383*** 0.187*** 
 
[0.045] [0.043] [0.048] 
Female -0.189*** 
  
 
[0.051] 
  
Married* Female -0.250*** 
  
 
[0.062] 
  
Number of previous spells 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.063*** 
 
[0.007] [0.009] [0.011] 
No degree -0.368*** -0.408*** -0.334*** 
 
[0.056] [0.072] [0.088] 
General degree 0.062 0.041 0.068 
 
[0.101] [0.134] [0.151] 
Upper vocational 0.094* 0.092+ 0.101+ 
 
[0.038] [0.049] [0.058] 
University 0.278*** 0.189*** 0.397*** 
 
[0.042] [0.055] [0.068] 
Hartz 0.426** 0.339+ 0.492** 
 
[0.133] [0.183] [0.191] 
Age 45-49 -0.101 -0.028 -0.185+ 
 
[0.067] [0.089] [0.100] 
Age 50-54 -0.257** -0.133 -0.350* 
 
[0.099] [0.131] [0.148] 
Age 55-59 -1.081*** -0.809*** -1.382*** 
 
[0.133] [0.175] [0.206] 
Age 60-64 -1.371*** -1.021*** -2.003** 
 
[0.232] [0.272] [0.630] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.081 0.053 0.137 
 
[0.102] [0.137] [0.146] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.059 0.022 0.078 
 
[0.107] [0.145] [0.161] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.292* 0.468** -0.067 
 
[0.143] [0.171] [0.263] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 0.450 0.372 0.917 
 
[0.282] [0.323] [0.699] 
Number of obs. 7846 4217 3629 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups and basic 
vocational training for education. Year dummies are included. Adjusted robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table 5 provides estimations of the unemployment-to-employment hazard rate using gamma 
frailty correction for unobserved heterogeneity. The estimate of the theta parameter indicates 
that heterogeneity is significant: the share of individuals with poor unobserved characteristics 
becomes larger as the length of the spell increase. Results from Table 5 are consistent with 
our previous findings. In particular, the differential effect of the reform for those aged 55-59 
remains positive and statistically significant. The effect of the reform for those aged 60-64 is 
also large and positive, but insignificant. Again, we suspect that small sample size for this age 
group could potentially blur the results. In any case, this suggests that the reform operated 
mainly by deterring early retirement strategies, which were especially prevalent for these 
groups. 
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Table 5: Unemployment-to-employment hazard rate analysis (exponential distribution of 
duration dependency, gamma-distributed frailty) 
  All Men Women 
East German -0.070+ 0.077 -0.246*** 
 
[0.042] [0.058] [0.062] 
Non-German citizen -0.588*** -0.556*** -0.591*** 
 
[0.077] [0.097] [0.124] 
Age -0.025** -0.041*** -0.009 
 
[0.008] [0.011] [0.011] 
Married 0.505*** 0.516*** 0.232*** 
 
[0.058] [0.059] [0.060] 
Female -0.313*** 
  
 
[0.068] 
  
Married* Female -0.298*** 
  
 
[0.082] 
  
Number of previous spells 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 
 
[0.009] [0.011] [0.013] 
No degree -0.486*** -0.611*** -0.382*** 
 
[0.076] [0.103] [0.111] 
General degree 0.108 0.052 0.130 
 
[0.130] [0.177] [0.189] 
Upper vocational 0.096* 0.082 0.123+ 
 
[0.049] [0.066] [0.073] 
University 0.316*** 0.184* 0.486*** 
 
[0.055] [0.075] [0.084] 
Hartz 0.547*** 0.436+ 0.594** 
 
[0.165] [0.235] [0.230] 
Age 45-49 -0.168+ -0.100 -0.232+ 
 
[0.087] [0.123] [0.124] 
Age 50-54 -0.349** -0.240 -0.417* 
 
[0.126] [0.176] [0.182] 
Age 55-59 -1.361*** -1.112*** -1.562*** 
 
[0.167] [0.229] [0.245] 
Age 60-64 -1.598*** -1.229*** -2.081** 
 
[0.276] [0.339] [0.678] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.144 0.107 0.183 
 
[0.123] [0.172] [0.171] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.071 0.011 0.132 
 
[0.132] [0.181] [0.191] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.389* 0.643** -0.046 
 
[0.172] [0.220] [0.289] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 0.506 0.440 0.883 
 
[0.327] [0.383] [0.757] 
Constant -1.526*** -0.898* -2.497*** 
 
[0.325] [0.448] [0.471] 
Ln(teta) -0.433*** -0.314*** -0.738*** 
 
[0.050] [0.059] [0.103] 
Number of obs. 7846 4217 3629 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups and basic 
vocational training for education. Year dummies are included. Adjusted robust standard errors in brackets. 
Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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5.3. Reform impact on job matching quality 
We now turn to the regressions results for the three post-unemployment outcomes we have 
defined. For presentation purpose, we only display the coefficients for the interaction terms of 
interest.14 Table 6 provides the results of the reform impact on job stability, assessed by the 
duration of the job that directly follows unemployment. According to job matching quality 
arguments, less generous benefits should increase pressures on unemployed to take up jobs 
for which they are less qualified: in turn, this should decrease the stability of the match. At 
first sight, our results are at odds with this prediction. All coefficients for the interacted terms 
are positive, indicating longer re-employment duration for the treated age groups. This 
statement should be nuanced, as the estimates are only significant for the 55-59 age group, at 
the 1% threshold. The coefficient for the 60-64 age group is relatively large also, but not 
significant. However, we do not interpret these findings as an increase in job matching 
quality. We argue that this effect should in fact be assigned to the parallel evolution in 
retirement regulations, when the legal age threshold for early retirement was raised from 60 to 
63. Prior to 2006, re-employment duration was shorter because re-employed could retire at a 
younger age. Postponing the age threshold for early retirement eventually led to a substantial 
increase in re-employment duration for those individuals closer to this age threshold. 
 
                                                 
14
 Tables displaying all explanatory variables can be found in appendix (Tables A3 to A9) 
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Table 6: Re-employment duration (OLS regression) 
  All Men Women 
Hartz*Age 45-49 3.787 5.223 1.938 
 
[3.056] [4.166] [4.493] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 4.745 6.807 2.557 
 
[3.327] [4.597] [4.841] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 11.612** 13.162* 9.252 
 
[4.353] [5.265] [8.077] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 11.287 13.407 10.104 
 
[8.504] [9.843] [20.709] 
Number of obs. 4578 2611 1967 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies 
are included. Adjusted robust standard errors in brackets. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001. 
In Table 7, we display the results for our second measure of job matching quality. This 
variable gives respondents assessment of whether they are working in the occupation they 
were trained for (the question relates to primary education, not training provided by 
employment services). Three possible answers are given: ‘working in the occupation trained 
for’, ‘not working in the occupation trained for’ and ‘no training needed for this occupation’. 
The third category of outcome is more difficult to interpret. For some respondents it might 
indicate a mismatch, because they have been trained for an occupation but are working in an 
occupation that does not necessitate any. But for those who did not receive any training such a 
match would be considered as normal. The only age group that is significantly affected are 
those aged 60-64 years old, whose exits to employment are more headed towards occupations 
they were not trained for. This increase in job mismatches might be ascribed to the increased 
pressures to take-up jobs induced by the reforms. Nevertheless, this result should be 
interpreted cautiously, as it does not concern a large number of cases in our sample. 
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Table 7: Matching between skills and occupation after unemployment (multinomial logit, 
reference is ‘exit to an occupation matching with skills’) 
 
Not in the 
occupation trained for 
No training needed 
for this occupation  
Hartz*Age 45-49 -0.134 -0.274 
 
[0.244] [0.861] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.123 0.265 
 
[0.270] [0.786] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 -0.010 -0.478 
 
[0.351] [1.189] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 2.328** 1.702 
 
[0.781] [1802.926] 
Number of obs. 4578 4578 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies 
are included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
Finally, Table 8 provides results about the type of job contracts after exits to employment, 
distinguishing between part-time job, full-time job and mini-job. The results here are rather 
scant. Exits to part-time, as compared to full-time, tend to increase for most age groups (45-
49, 50-54 and 55-59), but the coefficient is only significant for the 50-54 age group, and only 
at the 10% threshold. While there was a contemporaneous increase in the total number of 
atypical jobs in Germany during that period, it does not seem that the duration cuts 
particularly contributed to enhance this trend. The coefficients of the 60-64 age group for 
exits toward part-time and mini-jobs are negative, which would suggest that this particular 
category was more likely to find a full-time job. While the coefficients are pretty large, they 
are not significant though. 
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Table 8: Type of first employment contract after unemployment (multinomial logit, reference 
is ‘exit to full-time employment’) 
  Part-time job Mini-job 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.170 -0.136 
 
[0.299] [0.417] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.603+ 0.218 
 
[0.313] [0.444] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.508 0.099 
 
[0.394] [0.511] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 -0.806 -0.991 
 
[0.941] [0.784] 
Number of obs. 4578 4578 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies 
are included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To sum up, we have shown that the recent cuts in compensation duration induced by the Hartz 
reforms did not have the kind of sizeable effects on unemployment duration expected by job 
search theories. Only one specific age group, aged 55 to 59, had significant lower 
unemployment duration after the reform. But as we argue, this can better be ascribed to the 
deterring effect the reform had on early retirement strategies, in combination with other 
changes in early retirement provisions. Besides, we also found evidence that the reform had 
some effects on post-unemployment outcomes. Again re-employment duration of the 55-59 
age group has been substantially and positively affected. While this comes in contradiction 
with job matching theories, it corroborates our point that the contemporaneous rise in the legal 
age for early retirement had a substantial impact on workers decisions to delay their exit from 
the labour market. Eventually, some detrimental effects of the reform on post-unemployment 
outcomes have been found: skills inadequacy has increased for the oldest unemployed (60-64 
years old) while unemployed aged 50 to 54 experienced slightly more exits toward part-time 
employment. 
To conclude, we would also like to acknowledge some limits of our empirical strategy. First, 
we are only assessing here the average effect of the entitlement cuts for the relatively large 
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age groups we have defined. Thus we cannot exclude that the reform had a negative effect on 
unemployment duration for some narrower age groups. Also, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the effect would have been larger if the initial stronger cuts in compensation 
duration of 2006 would have been maintained. While this implies that our results cannot be 
easily generalised to other reforms where cuts in benefits have been sharper, our point 
remains that in this case the reform impact on unemployment duration was not very sizeable. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 : Descriptive statistics on the sample 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
East German 0.450 [0.498] 
Non-German citizen 0.102 [0.303] 
Age 46.943 [8.040] 
Married 0.676 [0.468] 
Female 0.462 [0.499] 
Number of previous spells 2.530 [2.128] 
No degree 0.129 [0.335] 
Basic vocational training 0.337 [0.473] 
General degree 0.024 [0.153] 
Upper vocational 0.347 [0.476] 
University 0.164 [0.370] 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. 
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Table A2: Unemployment-to-employment hazard rate analysis (no year dummies) 
  
Cox model 
Exponential distribution, 
Gamma frailty 
East German -0.048 -0.054 
 
[0.032] [0.041] 
Non-German Citizen -0.409*** -0.567*** 
 
[0.057] [0.076] 
Age -0.020** -0.027*** 
 
[0.006] [0.008] 
Married 0.401*** 0.509*** 
 
[0.045] [0.058] 
Female -0.195*** -0.321*** 
 
[0.051] [0.069] 
Married* Female -0.238*** -0.283*** 
 
[0.062] [0.082] 
Number of previous spells 0.049*** 0.070*** 
 
[0.007] [0.009] 
No degree -0.371*** -0.490*** 
 
[0.056] [0.075] 
General degree 0.041 0.087 
 
[0.101] [0.130] 
Upper vocational 0.078* 0.074 
 
[0.037] [0.048] 
University 0.274*** 0.310*** 
 
[0.042] [0.055] 
Hartz 0.167** 0.233*** 
 
[0.057] [0.068] 
Age 45-49 -0.099 -0.159+ 
 
[0.067] [0.087] 
Age 50-54 -0.248* -0.327** 
 
[0.098] [0.126] 
Age 55-59 -1.065*** -1.328*** 
 
[0.132] [0.166] 
Age 60-64 -1.376*** -1.595*** 
 
[0.232] [0.276] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.076 0.144 
 
[0.101] [0.122] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.034 0.044 
 
[0.106] [0.131] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.283* 0.393* 
 
[0.142] [0.171] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 0.442 0.518 
 
[0.281] [0.324] 
Constant   -1.534*** 
  
[0.319] 
Ln(teta) 
 
-0.415*** 
  
[0.049] 
Number of obs. 7846 7846 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups and basic vocational training 
for education. Adjusted robust standard errors in brackets. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A3: Re-employment duration (OLS regression) 
  All Men Women 
East German -6.039*** -6.757*** -5.874*** 
 
[0.999] [1.336] [1.537] 
Non-German citizen -3.659* -2.561 -5.854+ 
 
[1.811] [2.266] [3.049] 
Age -0.204 -0.152 -0.228 
 
[0.191] [0.258] [0.285] 
Married 4.176** 4.654*** 0.242 
 
[1.306] [1.336] [1.464] 
Female -0.527 - - 
 
[1.581] 
  Married* Female -3.744+ - - 
 
[1.930] 
  Nb of previous spells -1.445*** -1.641*** -1.000** 
 
[0.210] [0.262] [0.360] 
No degree -0.850 -3.011 2.311 
 
[1.708] [2.325] [2.572] 
General degree 1.923 2.052 2.148 
 
[2.956] [4.136] [4.257] 
Upper vocational 5.185*** 5.974*** 5.093** 
 
[1.166] [1.531] [1.845] 
University 6.852*** 6.686*** 8.014*** 
 
[1.343] [1.778] [2.113] 
Hartz -3.137 -4.247 -2.557 
 
[4.090] [5.658] [5.931] 
Age 45-49 -2.782 -4.195 -1.431 
 
[2.060] [2.817] [3.025] 
Age 50-54 -3.646 -7.118+ 0.323 
 
[2.975] [4.038] [4.425] 
Age 55-59 -8.469* -11.295* -5.344 
 
[3.921] [5.225] [6.075] 
Age 60-64 -10.631 -12.065 -12.577 
 
[7.013] [8.304] [18.395] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 3.787 5.223 1.938 
 
[3.056] [4.166] [4.493] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 4.745 6.807 2.557 
 
[3.327] [4.597] [4.841] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 11.612** 13.162* 9.252 
 
[4.353] [5.265] [8.077] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 11.287 13.407 10.104 
 
[8.504] [9.843] [20.709] 
Constant 50.490*** 45.860*** 52.915*** 
 
[7.831] [10.525] [11.748] 
Number of obs. 4578 2611 1967 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies 
are included. Adjusted robust standard errors in brackets. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001. 
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Table A4: Matching between skills and occupation after unemployment (multinomial logit, 
reference is ‘exit to an occupation matching with skills’) 
  
Not in the occupation 
trained for 
No training is needed for 
this occupation 
East German 0.522*** -0.725* 
 
[0.080] [0.284] 
Non-German citizen 0.047 0.639** 
 
[0.157] [0.234] 
Age 0.000 -0.005 
 
[0.015] [0.037] 
Married -0.324** -1.024*** 
 
[0.111] [0.283] 
Female 0.118 -0.187 
 
[0.134] [0.318] 
Married* Female 0.205 1.049** 
 
[0.161] [0.389] 
Number of previous spells 0.023 0.081* 
 
[0.020] [0.039] 
No degree 0.701*** 3.450*** 
 
[0.192] [0.272] 
General degree 0.025 2.012*** 
 
[0.259] [0.381] 
Upper vocational -0.481*** -2.034*** 
 
[0.094] [0.497] 
University -0.739*** -1.243** 
 
[0.106] [0.432] 
Hartz -0.473*** -0.586+ 
 
[0.139] [0.325] 
Age 45-49 0.201 -0.175 
 
[0.168] [0.400] 
Age 50-54 0.346 -0.239 
 
[0.244] [0.595] 
Age 55-59 0.221 0.221 
 
[0.325] [0.773] 
Age 60-64 -1.305+ -15.229 
 
[0.671] [1077.858] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 -0.134 -0.274 
 
[0.244] [0.861] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.123 0.265 
 
[0.270] [0.786] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 -0.010 -0.478 
 
[0.351] [1.189] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 2.328** 1.702 
 
[0.781] [1802.926] 
Constant 0.289 -1.895 
 
[0.619] [1.473] 
Number of obs. 4578 4578 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies 
are included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A5: Matching between skills and occupation after unemployment for men (multinomial 
logit, reference is ‘exit to an occupation matching with skills’) 
  
Not in the occupation 
trained for 
No training is needed 
for this occupation 
East German 0.454*** -0.760+ 
 
[0.109] [0.394] 
Non-German citizen -0.072 0.469 
 
[0.190] [0.308] 
Age 0.006 -0.004 
 
[0.021] [0.051] 
Married -0.296** -0.798** 
 
[0.112] [0.281] 
Number of previous spells 0.039 0.139** 
 
[0.025] [0.045] 
No degree 0.610** 2.682*** 
 
[0.236] [0.341] 
General degree 0.906* 2.947*** 
 
[0.451] [0.559] 
Upper vocational -0.432*** -2.301** 
 
[0.124] [0.756] 
University -0.523*** -0.537 
 
[0.141] [0.450] 
Hartz -0.236 -0.408 
 
[0.189] [0.436] 
Age 45-49 -0.067 0.158 
 
[0.230] [0.574] 
Age 50-54 0.190 -0.369 
 
[0.329] [0.868] 
Age 55-59 0.193 0.141 
 
[0.428] [1.086] 
Age 60-64 -1.353+ -17.552 
 
[0.747] [4594.521] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 -0.432 -0.586 
 
[0.334] [1.167] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.194 0.161 
 
[0.387] [1.236] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 -0.172 -0.022 
 
[0.425] [1.250] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 1.897* 1.522 
 
[0.887] [8396.876] 
Constant -0.001 -2.026 
 
[0.827] [1.996] 
Number of obs. 2611 2611 
Sample: SOEP, men aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies are 
included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A6: Matching between skills and occupation after unemployment for women 
(multinomial logit, reference is ‘exit to an occupation matching with skills’)  
  
Not in the occupation 
trained for 
No training is needed 
for this occupation 
East German 0.635*** -0.592 
 
[0.122] [0.425] 
Non-German citizen 0.248 1.080** 
 
[0.294] [0.397] 
Age -0.008 -0.025 
 
[0.023] [0.057] 
Married -0.176 -0.075 
 
[0.121] [0.299] 
Number of previous spells 0.002 0.003 
 
[0.033] [0.090] 
No degree 1.003** 4.624*** 
 
[0.354] [0.514] 
General degree -0.646+ 1.570* 
 
[0.339] [0.623] 
Upper vocational -0.553*** -1.539* 
 
[0.148] [0.709] 
University -0.995*** -14.372 
 
[0.166] [430.107] 
Hartz -0.726*** -0.683 
 
[0.210] [0.510] 
Age 45-49 0.500* -0.397 
 
[0.250] [0.590] 
Age 50-54 0.489 -0.191 
 
[0.367] [0.881] 
Age 55-59 0.083 0.324 
 
[0.518] [1.174] 
Age 60-64 -16.238 -17.845 
 
[2172.122] [5268.529] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.252 0.209 
 
[0.367] [1.272] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.142 0.728 
 
[0.386] [1.104] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.075 -14.639 
 
[0.647] [1657.300] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 17.613 3.260 
 
[2172.122] [5872.795] 
Constant 0.843 -1.489 
 
[0.945] [2.335] 
Number of obs. 1967 1967 
Sample: SOEP, women aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies are 
included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A7: Employment contract found after unemployment (multinomial logit, reference is 
‘exit to full-time employment’) 
  
Exit to part-time 
employment 
Exit to mini-job 
East German -0.948*** -0.070 
 
[0.096] [0.163] 
Non-German citizen -0.154 0.078 
 
[0.175] [0.277] 
Age -0.006 0.004 
 
[0.018] [0.032] 
Married -0.409* -0.347 
 
[0.167] [0.263] 
Female 1.605*** 1.443*** 
 
[0.159] [0.252] 
Married* Female 0.802*** 0.564+ 
 
[0.198] [0.316] 
Number of previous spells -0.021 -0.045 
 
[0.022] [0.033] 
No degree -0.086 0.521* 
 
[0.162] [0.234] 
General degree 0.009 -0.165 
 
[0.272] [0.416] 
Upper vocational 0.273* -0.226 
 
[0.111] [0.184] 
University 0.260* -0.860*** 
 
[0.126] [0.251] 
Hartz -0.728+ -0.753+ 
 
[0.393] [0.445] 
Age 45-49 0.123 0.269 
 
[0.193] [0.341] 
Age 50-54 0.146 0.159 
 
[0.281] [0.498] 
Age 55-59 0.992** 1.049+ 
 
[0.364] [0.637] 
Age 60-64 1.072+ 2.545** 
 
[0.647] [0.886] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.170 -0.136 
 
[0.299] [0.417] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.603+ 0.218 
 
[0.313] [0.444] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.508 0.099 
 
[0.394] [0.511] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 -0.806 -0.991 
 
[0.941] [0.784] 
Constant -2.167** -6.353*** 
 
[0.740] [1.626] 
Number of obs. 5654 5654 
Sample: SOEP, individuals aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies 
are included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A8: Employment contract found after unemployment for men (multinomial logit, 
reference is ‘exit to full-time employment’) 
  
Exit to part-time 
employment 
Exit to mini-job 
East German -0.721*** -0.030 
 
[0.184] [0.293] 
Non-German citizen -0.026 0.677+ 
 
[0.295] [0.383] 
Age -0.052 0.034 
 
[0.037] [0.058] 
Married -0.461** -0.451 
 
[0.175] [0.278] 
Number of previous spells 0.001 0.026 
 
[0.034] [0.047] 
No degree 0.077 0.308 
 
[0.328] [0.407] 
General degree 0.914* -14.657 
 
[0.446] [1176.156] 
Upper vocational 0.306 -0.864* 
 
[0.220] [0.350] 
University 0.829*** -0.193 
 
[0.215] [0.356] 
Hartz -1.600* -1.242 
 
[0.725] [0.989] 
Age 45-49 0.412 -0.134 
 
[0.410] [0.627] 
Age 50-54 0.799 -0.620 
 
[0.580] [0.902] 
Age 55-59 1.942** 0.565 
 
[0.726] [1.121] 
Age 60-64 2.318* 1.635 
 
[1.028] [1.410] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 -0.032 -1.119 
 
[0.886] [1.151] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.696 0.059 
 
[0.797] [0.950] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 0.705 -0.325 
 
[0.710] [0.771] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 -0.065 -0.680 
 
[1.301] [0.957] 
Constant -1.363 -21.164 
 
[1.542] [2202.125] 
Number of obs. 2969 2969 
Sample: SOEP, men aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies are 
included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A9: Employment contract found after unemployment for women (multinomial logit, 
reference is ‘exit to full-time employment’) 
  
Exit to part-time 
employment 
Exit to mini-job 
East German -1.064*** -0.085 
 
[0.118] [0.202] 
Non-German citizen -0.331 -0.615 
 
[0.226] [0.424] 
Age -0.003 -0.019 
 
[0.021] [0.039] 
Married 0.420*** 0.239 
 
[0.112] [0.183] 
Number of previous spells -0.040 -0.113* 
 
[0.028] [0.048] 
No degree -0.156 0.634* 
 
[0.197] [0.298] 
General degree -0.338 0.050 
 
[0.337] [0.452] 
Upper vocational 0.222 -0.053 
 
[0.137] [0.236] 
University -0.119 -1.392*** 
 
[0.158] [0.357] 
Hartz -0.307 -0.567 
 
[0.494] [0.529] 
Age 45-49 0.116 0.580 
 
[0.228] [0.414] 
Age 50-54 0.061 0.588 
 
[0.334] [0.610] 
Age 55-59 0.767+ 1.259 
 
[0.452] [0.802] 
Age 60-64 1.046 -13.668 
 
[1.329] [6948.662] 
Hartz*Age 45-49 0.287 0.067 
 
[0.346] [0.484] 
Hartz*Age 50-54 0.645+ 0.220 
 
[0.370] [0.527] 
Hartz*Age 55-59 1.965* 1.682+ 
 
[0.834] [0.964] 
Hartz*Age 60-64 -1.719 14.767 
 
[1.690] [6948.662] 
Constant -0.435 -3.724* 
 
[0.876] [1.839] 
Number of obs. 2685 2685 
Sample: SOEP, women aged 35-64. Notes: reference groups are aged 35-44 for age groups. Year dummies are 
included. Significance level: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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